Egyptian-Israeli Relations Are Warming Up

Egypt is currently rearranging its regional and international relations. On 21 June, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi authorized new appointments for Egypt's diplomatic staff around the world, including a new ambassador to Israel.

On 21 June, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi authorized new appointments for Egypt's diplomatic staff around the world, including a new ambassador to Israel. It is most likely that the new Egyptian ambassador, Hazem Khairat, will be in Tel Aviv next September after an interruption of almost three years since Mohamed Morsi withdrew the Egyptian ambassador from Israel in protest over the Israeli military operation, Pillar of Defense, in Gaza in November 2012. This step by Egypt raised several questions concerning the reasons behind it and its impact on the future of Egyptian-Israeli relations, as well as the peace process in the Middle East.

This decision by Egypt can be explained by five key factors. The first relates to the mainstream of Egyptian-Israeli relations since the end of the seventies when the two countries signed the Camp David peace agreement. Although what some called a "cold peace" emerged between Egypt and Israel as a result of public opinion pressures on President Mubarak, particularly from Islamic movements, along with the withdrawal of the Egyptian ambassador in Tel Aviv after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, and the aftermath of the events regarding the al-Aqsa mosque and the second intifada in 2000. Egyptian-Israeli relations throughout three decades have been generally stable and warm, and there was obvious cooperation and understanding between the two countries.

Even under the rule of the Muslim Brotherhood in 2012 and 2013, Egypt and Israel were on good terms. In return for American support, the Brotherhood confirmed to the United States and Israel their ability to control Hamas, allowing Palestinian settlement in northeast Sinai and opening Egyptian doors to Israeli investments. Despite the withdrawal of the Egyptian ambassador, Israel did not withdraw its ambassador from Egypt, a gesture reflecting its desire to maintain relations with Egypt.

Egypt is currently rearranging its regional and international relations; therefore, the need emerged to restore relations between the two countries to its former track.

The second factor is related to Egyptian-American relations and the fact that the improvement of relations between Egypt and Israel may be a source of input, and possibly a condition, for the improvement in US-Egyptian relations. The Egyptian decision can be explained in light of the US decision to resume military aid to Egypt, $1.3 billion yearly, which was suspended since the June 30 revolution. Israel remains silent towards what is going on in Egypt. It believes that the Obama administration made some mistakes in assessing the situation and dealing with it after June 30. Moreover, cutting off American aid to Egypt or punishing it may negatively affect the security of Israel, and the peace treaty between the two countries. According to the American press, Israel went to great lengths to smooth things out between the new Egyptian regime and the United States.

The third factor concerns the Middle East map of allies and enemies for Egypt. Israel represents one side of the non-Arab power triangle in the region, which also includes Turkey and Iran. With the high tensions in Egyptian-Turkish relations after June 30, and continued cooling of relations with Iran in the context of strained Saudi-Iranian relations, it was important for Egypt to restore some warmth in its relationship with Israel to break the tension in the triangle that surrounds Egypt.

The fourth factor is related to the Egyptian-Ethiopian relations. Egypt understands quite well that the stability of relations and the level of understanding with Ethiopia, especially over the Renaissance Dam, must pass through the Israeli gate, as the relations between Ethiopia and Israel are very stable and strategic, and Israel enjoys considerable influence on Addis Ababa.

Finally, the Palestine factor is very important for the Egyptian decision. On the one hand, Egypt wants to maintain its role as a regional mediator in the peace process. The role that has been played by Egypt for decades cannot be resumed without an open diplomatic channel with Israel. On the other hand, Egypt has the desire to curb terrorist activities emanating from the Gaza Strip into Sinai. Hamas and other Palestinian groups in Gaza are rendering assistance to Islamist terrorist groups in Sinai. Egypt is acting aggressively against terror cells. To this end, Egypt has banned Hamas from operating inside Egypt, accused the group of aiding Egyptian terrorists, accused it of espionage and tried many of its members in absentia. Hamas was also blamed for a jailbreak during the 2011 Egyptian revolution. To be more effective in fighting terror, it also requires closer coordination with Israel. Israel has allowed Egypt to exceed the number of its troops, tanks and helicopters in Sinai, as stipulated in the Israel-Egypt peace treaty.

The Egyptian interests were the driving force for the improvement in Egyptian-Israeli relations. It is hard to ignore the fact that they enjoy not only tactical cooperation on the ground, but also a convergence of strategic interests. Still, the negative Egyptian public opinion sentiments towards Israel are an important challenge. Egypt probably wants to keep its warmer relationship with Israel under wraps, cool on the surface and warm in the core.

Views expressed are of individual Members and Contributors, rather than the Club's, unless explicitly stated otherwise.