Under the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act, the administration must submit the text of the agreement and all related materials to Congress within five days after reaching an agreement with Iran.
Nuclear talks in Vienna have been extended amid disagreements over the lifting of an arms embargo on Iran, but western diplomats remained hopeful that an agreement could be reached relatively soon.
The diplomats insisted that differences between Iran and six world powers conducting the talks continued to narrow with every passing hour and that only a handful of significant issues remained unresolved.
Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif wanted to discuss sanction relief and Western plans to extend some sanctions and suspend the rest. As a result, the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which was scheduled to be done by June 30, has been put off.
Mohammad Zarif may bring new conditions back to Vienna that could prevent the signing of the action plan, or force the group of five permanent UN Security Council members and Germany to review their stance. This would not be suitable for the Obama administration in light of the ongoing presidential campaign. All of the presidential candidates regard the White House’s Iran stance as too soft and the agreement that has been prepared for signing as a bad deal. Hillary Clinton, who is the most probable Democratic nominee, recalled that Iran was a historical adversary of the United States, making her unlikely to carry on President Obama’s policy of softening the anti-Iranian sanctions.
Under the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act, the administration must submit the text of the agreement and all related materials to Congress within five days after reaching an agreement with Iran. Congress will have 30 days to review the agreement, and, if necessary, amend it. This would give Republicans, who have the majority in both houses, enough time to block the deal.
Great Britain is also against the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, with Foreign Secretary Philip Hammond saying that “no deal was better than a bad deal.”
Israel has been even more outspoken, pointing out the following:
First, there is a major difference between the Joint Plan of Action of November 24, 2013 and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), in particular on the ratification of the Additional Protocol to the IAEA Safeguards Agreement signed in 1997. In fact, Iran would become a threshold country capable of creating nuclear weapons within 12 months, which would have a negative impact on the region and on the global non-proliferation regime;
Second, the verification mechanism set out in the agreement would be ineffective. In particular, the proposed Joint Committee at the UN Security Council would be unable to consider all concerns regarding Iran. The committee’s activity would undermine the stance of the IAEA and prevent the United States from using force against Iran.
Third, the IAEA lacks financial and other resources for the full implementation of the JCPOA.
Fourth, Iran is only prepared to contain its regional ambitions for some time in order to encourage the lifting of unilateral and other sanctions against it, and will again resume the creation of nuclear weapons in the future.
Nevertheless, the sides have coordinated part of a UN Security Council resolution that would replace the previous six UNSC resolutions. It will likely ban the supply of weapons to Iran, reaffirm the existing restrictions on Iran’s missile program, and introduce strict export control measures on Tehran.
Iran’s stance on the matter is unclear. It has probably agreed to the gradual lifting of international sanctions based on reports by IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano, which can be considered a compromise. However, Americans have a strong influence over Amano. Therefore, there is no certainty that the information in his reports is objective and that it does not carry components that serve US interests.
Take the unilateral sanctions adopted by the EU, the US and their allies. They may not be imposed over Tehran’s nuclear program, but instead over alleged support for international terrorism in countries like Yemen. Moreover, US sanctions on Iran for terrorism, human rights abuses, and ballistic missiles will remain in place.
US presidents have signed a total of 18 executive orders against Iran, the first of which was in 1979. US Congress and the EU have approved 10 laws and four documents, respectively. Therefore, half of the US sanctions are unrelated to Iran’s nuclear program. The US president can terminate or resume the orders against Iran. As for laws, the president has fewer rights and can only suspend them for six months.
On the other hand, the role of financial and economic sanctions should not be overestimated. The harsher the sanctions, the more they will rally Iranians against the United States. European experts believe that the sanctions against Iran will eventually be so diluted that they become completely ineffective.
Washington knows that the difficult relationship it has had with Russia lately could complicate its relations with Iran, so it has tried to draw a line between the Iranian nuclear crisis and its other concerns, for example, Ukraine. As unhappy as Washington is with Russia’s decision to supply its S-300 air defense missile systems to Iran, it has looked the other way on this development in order to maintain Moscow’s support in the Iran talks.
Russia and Iran are still haggling over an agreement on the removal of excessive nuclear material (uranium hexafluoride, or UF6) from Iran. Attempts to remove the material have repeatedly been made, but have never been put into practice.
In conclusion, here is what Iran and the P5+1 group have agreed on:
Iran will reduce the amount of installed centrifuges in the country to 6,104.
Iran will not build any new uranium enrichment facilities for 15 years.
Iran will reduce its current stockpile of low-enriched uranium (LEU) to 300 kg of 3.67 percent LEU hexafluoride for 15 years.
Iran has agreed that the 1,044 IR-1 centrifuges it will install at its underground Fordow will not be used to enrich uranium for at least 15 years.
Iran will reduce the number of IR-1 first-generation centrifuges at Natanz to 5,060 for ten years.
Iran has agreed to use only low-yield gas centrifuges (IR-1 models) for 10 years.
Iran will dismantle or remove the core of the heavy-water reactor it is building in Arak to prevent it being used for the production of weapons-grade uranium. All spent fuel from Arak is to be shipped out of country for the lifetime of the reactor.
These and other measures point to Iran’s readiness to continue discussing its nuclear program, but the West is still not satisfied. This has caused Iran to wonder whether it has made too many concessions. It is doubtful that this will help resolve the Iranian nuclear crisis.
