Changes in Political Sentiments of Russian Citizens After the Presidential Elections

Given the sheer political impassiveness of the overwhelming part of population in Russia, the implementation of the protest-revolutionary scenario is not viable under current conditions. However, its rising legitimacy in society increases sensitivity to the potential triggers of mass protests. The new wave of the economic crisis could become one of such triggers.

Excerpts from the report of the Experts of the Center for Strategic Research to the Committee of Civic Initiatives.

The new round of CSR’s research testifies to fast and profound changes occurring in the political conscience of the Russian people. These changes confirm that the continuing decline in the trust in the authorities is due to fundamental reasons. It is linked to the increased alienation of the population from the authorities as well as to the demand to renew the authorities as the population can see no real opportunities to achieve this goal.

Deteriorated attitude to Vladimir Putin is expressed not only in an extremely irritated response to his PR campaigns and political rhetoric but also in the fact that in the absence of new positive results his past political merits get quickly forgotten.

The victory in the presidential election held in an environment of descending trend of trust was achieved at the cost of giving rise to exaggerated and inexecutable expectations from the new presidency. The impossibility to implement them has to be paid for now with accelerated fall in trust and further distancing of the people from the authorities.

This frustration extends throughout the whole political arena. There is a perceptible deterioration in the attitude to Dmitry Medvedev, the United Russia as well as to all political parties and political leaders including those of the opposition, and to the electoral system.

The psychological tests have shown that the authorities are perceived antagonistically – as something strong but pursuing personal advantages, acting aggressively, and posing a source of increased danger. At the level of subconscious the respondents consider their relations with the authorities as alienated, distanced and hostile. In the projective psychological tests the respondents describe them as relations typical of wildlife between the predators with which the authorities are associated, and their victims with which the people are associated.

The interference of the Russian Orthodox Church with politics does not only impede the reduction of tensions between the authorities and society but also brings forth new sources of confrontation. According to the projective psychological tests, in respect of its attitude to the Russian Orthodox Church Russian society is split into two unequal antagonistic groups – with an express positive attitude (a majority), and with an acutely negative attitude (a significant minority).

In their perception of the actual policy of the authorities the respondents lay the emphasis on negative aspects. The key items in the negative list score far more votes than the positive list items.

The subconscious image of ideal authorities is extremely different from the reality. Ideal relationships between the people and the authorities are characterized by togetherness, mutual respect and cooperation, which however are based on the people’s submission to the authorities. However, the respondents find it difficult to name potential national leaders who are promising in their opinion, and only have a vague idea about the possible action programme of such leaders.

A similar survey conducted among teenagers shows that a new generation is growing in Russia, and with different political mindsets: focus on the competence of the authorities, reduced distance between the authorities and the people, and a demand for horizontal and not vertical systems of interrelations. This generation will join universities on the eve of the next presidential election, and will be able to exercise certain influence on the course of political events.

Psychological testing has shown that a vast majority of the population suffers from a depressive state that we would identify as «learned helplessness syndrome». The population makes an increasingly more conscientious and rigorous demand for the renewal of the federal, regional and local authorities but is not ready to actively influence the political life neither through participation in the elections, nor through conscientious search of other solutions.

The results of pilot survey of the Daghestani community members revealed major differences in the psychological state of the Russian and Daghestani peoples. The learned helplessness syndrome turned out to be a typical of the Daghestanis, they are characterized by a proactive attitude towards the authorities, and they are subconsciously ready to confront the authorities. These differences correspond quite well to the differences between the electoral campaigns held in October. Unlike in the regions with predominantly Russian population, the results of voting in North Ossetia, Daghestan and Karachaevo-Cherkessia on October 14 were much less unambiguous than before. Opposition leaders and movements took shape there, and they are capable of offering resistance to the candidates of the authorities at elections, and attract a considerable portion of votes to their side.

The elections including the single voting date of October 14, have shown that the population is very sensitive to the defiant lack of prospects to renew the authorities through the election. In their turn, the awareness of lack of prospects and frustrated hopes for a voluntary change of political leaders result in swift increase of the legitimacy of protest-revolutionary scenarios to renew the authorities. For the first time throughout the whole history of our sociological observations, the scenario of renewing the authorities by protest and revolution was discussed in detail and unfailingly keenly by all of the focus-groups at the initiative of their participants.

Given the sheer political impassiveness of the overwhelming part of population in Russia, the implementation of the protest-revolutionary scenario is not viable under current conditions. However, its rising legitimacy in society increases sensitivity to the potential triggers of mass protests. The new wave of the economic crisis could become one of such triggers.

Views expressed are of individual Members and Contributors, rather than the Club's, unless explicitly stated otherwise.