Russia is not ready to take serious actions in the Middle East other than those that comply with international law. It will not allow the adoption of a resolution sanctioning the use of force against Syria and Iran, nor will it use force to counter actions unsanctioned by the world community either.
President Dmitry Medvedev’s tough statement on response measures to the missile defense deployment in Europe is not a sign of any serious deterioration in relations with the West. Alongside certain indications of their worsening, we can also see the continuation of the “reset.” New positive trends are even appearing, such as Russia’s forthcoming WTO accession, the potential abolishment of the Jackson-Vanik amendment and developments in Russia's relations with the European Union (EU), such as the recent commissioning of the Nord Stream gas pipeline. These trends do not fit in into the paradigm of a general deterioration of Russia’s relations with the West.
Moreover, in assessing the measures that the president has suggested, we must keep in mind that we are currently living in election campaign conditions, where every foreign policy move is being perceived more acutely. The emerging problems are largely connected with the circumstances of the election, whereby the leader bears a special responsibility to his people and must have a tougher response to any threat. This is why Russia’s encirclement with elements of the missile defense system is causing an especially sharp response from the national leaders now. Talks on missile defense are one source, albeit a very important one, of contradictions that threaten the entire edifice of the “reset.”
The attitude towards the events in the Middle East is another issue that influences Russia’s relations with the West. At the moment, the events surrounding Libya are causing an uproar, particularly the abuse of the UN Security Council mandate by NATO countries, and discord on sanctions against Syria.
Yet, there are no serious contradictions within these issues, much less any yawning gap that was typical of Soviet-U.S. relations in the Cold War era. To begin with, Russia, as well as Western countries, has a very negative attitude towards the use of armed force against peaceful demonstrators, and the civilian casualties that are inevitable when protests are suppressed by force. The Russian president has repeatedly sent messages to his Syrian counterpart Bashar al-Assad, urging him to refrain from the use of force, to carry out reforms and starting a dialogue with the opposition.
It would be incorrect to say that the efforts to prevent the adoption of the UN resolution, or the planned voyage of the Admiral Kuznetsov aircraft-carrier to the Syrian shores, implies a change in position or reckless support of a partner and ally. Most probably, Russia’s active diplomacy in this direction is primarily motivated by its desire to curb the interventionism of the United States that is becoming increasingly evident in its election campaign. Interventionism is typical not only of the U.S. but also of some of its allies, especially such European countries as France and Britain, which were very active during the Libyan operation.
Today this interventionism is reflected in the tough campaign of pressure on Damascus. In fact, the West had interfered in the civil war in Libya instead of ensuring a no-fly zone over Libya and protecting its citizens in line with the UN mandate. In my view, the fact that Russia abstained from the right to veto this resolution indicates that Russia had hoped for a package of international measures that would not encourage the civil war and would promote an early start of talks between the parties. In effect, Russia was cheated. It is for this reason that our leaders are not going to let anything like this happen in Syria, where the stakes are higher. The Libyan regime did not have much international weight, but Syria is a cornerstone in the balance of power in the Middle East. The United States wants to see the Syrian regime overthrown largely in order to carry out a strike against Iran. Russia is against the campaign of pressure against Iran as well.
Statements by BRICS countries support Russia’s position. They have always adhered to the principle of a multilateral approach to major issues such as these. In addition to China, India also supported Russia in the final communiqué of the foreign ministers meeting held on November 24. The Russian position is now shared by a powerful international association. BRICS support of Russia’s moves in the Middle East is a compelling argument indicating that Moscow’s actions are correct and legitimate.
Russia is not ready to take serious actions in the Middle East other than those that comply with international law. It will not allow the adoption of a resolution sanctioning the use of force against Syria and Iran, nor will it use force to counter actions unsanctioned by the world community either. However, the situation that is taking shape in Central Asia, where Russia is bound by certain commitments in the CSTO, the SCO, the CIS and potentially the Eurasian Union, is entirely different. Withdrawal of the international coalition forces from Afghanistan is bound to destabilize the region, and interference is practically inevitable if the security of Russia and its allies is threatened.
