The West can well afford to ignore the situation or even tacitly perpetuate it. The conflict is localized and has no impact on NATO security. Kiev's actions go against the spirit and the letter of the Minsk Agreements but no one seems to believe that they will ever be implemented. The fact that Berlin and other European capitals are now Petro Poroshenko's hostages will certainly irk the European leaders. But they will hardly be able to prevent him from sabotaging the Minsk Agreements.
The current surge of violence in the Donbass conflict zone was expected, but its intensity came as an unpleasant surprise for many, with military and civilian deaths at a level not seen since 2015. The Ukrainian authorities are seeking to exploit this opportune moment to carry out a sweeping political maneuver in relations with the West and Russia. What might the escalation lead to and what is to be expected from the key players?
To answer this question, we should first sort out the parties' main interests. The Ukrainian authorities want to attract as much Western attention to the conflict in Donbass as possible. The resumption of fighting is major news and a political pretext. It is being covered by the media and analyzed by national intelligence services and officials. Western leaders have to respond to the situation. But they cannot deviate too far from their position that presumes support for Ukraine. They are restricted by the existing narrative and the formal or informal commitments they have assumed. Therefore, even if they are displeased with the actions of the Ukrainian military, they will have to support Kiev by default or look the other way.
The current events are intended for a key target audience – the new US Administration, the US establishment and the US public. Kiev's grave concern is that the White House may change its policies on Ukraine now that Donald Trump is in office. Ukraine enjoys unqualified support in the Congress and the US establishment. But President Trump has demonstrated that he is willing to go against the tide. His stance on Ukraine is not obvious. Kiev is trying to downplay this vagueness to maintain the status quo in the US position or perhaps to make it even more anti-Russian. But the overriding priority is to prevent a radical change in US policy.
More likely than not, the Ukrainian leaders are acting on the assumption that any military actions under the present conditions are a low-risk affair. The Donbass self-defense forces are highly unlikely to launch major counter-offensives like they did near Ilovaisk or Debaltsevo. Therefore, Ukraine is free to test the strength of the DPR and LPR defenses and achieve small, if visible, successes like occupying demilitarized areas. Sabotage attacks against influential figures in the two republics also will go unanswered. The rebels will hardly come up with a fitting response. But even if they do, they will be condemned on a scale incomparably greater than the Ukrainians. The DPR and the LPR could be branded as terrorists which means another win for Kiev. In other words, Ukraine can afford to increase the pressure on the rebels with impunity, backing them further into a corner without fear of a powerful response. Simultaneously Kiev will torpedo the 2015 Minsk Agreements, which it sees as imposed by foreign powers and the current military situation.
The West can well afford to ignore the situation or even tacitly perpetuate it. The conflict is localized and has no impact on NATO security. Kiev's actions go against the spirit and the letter of the Minsk Agreements but no one seems to believe that they will ever be implemented. Or their implementation is made contingent exclusively on Moscow's good will. The anti-Russian sanctions are not affecting Europe or the USA in any radical way and therefore they can be intensified in parallel with increasing pressure on Russia.
Berlin's recent protest against the escalation sounded a discordant note. As one of the principal architects of the Minsk Agreements, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, in all likelihood, is unwilling to allow their final collapse. But she cannot influence Kiev either. The fact that Berlin and other European capitals are now Petro Poroshenko's hostages will certainly irk the European leaders. But they will hardly be able to prevent him from sabotaging the Minsk Agreements.
As far as the United States is concerned, it has long practised a "laboratory" approach to the conflict, based on the assumption that you can make an opponent behave in a desired way by creating positive or negative stimuli. But Russia is not a laboratory rat and can itself create inducements and stimuli. Unlike many other states that can have a say internationally only on a specific set of issues, Russia may play on several fields at once. Donald Trump seems to feel this intuitively and regards Moscow as a "normal" player with its own legitimate interests and that political deals have to be made.
It is another matter that Trump himself has very limited influence on the situation. Lifting the anti-Russian sanctions will not bring him meaningful benefits. It is unlikely that Russia will trade sanctions relief for concessions in Syria or a breakup with Iran or a cool-off with China. We can hardly expect that the Ukrainian problem will be resolved as collateral to a bargain on strategic stability, given the vagueness of Washington's position in this regard. Trump may radically curtail military and other aid to Ukraine in line with his policy of cutting down on "non-core assets." But the existing volume of aid can hardly be called impressive and thus the move will not cause problems for Kiev. But if the escalation continues and the rebels launch an effective response, the Trump administration will have to respond, and the forces lobbying for an increase in pressure on Russia will gain additional points.
Moscow is interested in imposing a long-term freeze on the conflict and promoting reintegration of the two republics with Ukraine on the condition that they receive special status in keeping with the Minsk Agreements. But we cannot expect this to happen in the foreseeable future. Under the existing circumstances, two responses to the escalation are possible. First, a large-scale offensive by the DPR and LPR armies to rebuff the Ukrainian force, inflict a major defeat, sap its initiative, and force it to comply with the ceasefire. But this is a high-risk scenario. The rebels may lack the strength for a decisive victory, whereas the Ukrainian force is well-equipped, outnumbers the two armies, and has considerable fighting experience. It is even more important that in the case of victory any large-scale operations by the rebels will place them in an extremely unfavorable political position, providing a pretext for continued massive support of Ukraine from the outside. If, however, they lose, the prestige of the DPR and LPR authorities will be eroded, while the Ukrainian public, on the contrary, will become increasingly consolidated.
The second option is to contain the Ukrainian force in its present positions. This is a less risky strategy. The Ukrainian army has suffered serious losses in the course of the escalation. Keeping the offensive in high gear without visible results has the potential to increase antiwar sentiment in Ukraine and weaken hardliners in the West. It is in Moscow's interests to support German efforts to promote the Normandy format. Moreover, in the context of its dialogue with the new US administration the Kremlin may advance an initiative aimed at more active US involvement in resolving the conflict. Moscow has a stake in forming an effective international coalition that will facilitate the implementation of the Minsk Agreements and block Kiev's attempts to undermine them. The implementation of even one or several points listed in the agreements may become a turning point. A possible option is holding elections in the DPR and the LPR and establishing fully legitimate authorities recognized as such by the international community.
